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Abstract
The effects of oil shocks in inflation and growth have been widely discussed in the
literature, however few have focused on the impact of oil price increases on unemploy-
ment. In order to shed some light on this problem, this paper develops a medium scale
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model (dsge) that allows for oil utilization
in production and consumption as in Acurio-Va´sconez (2015); unemployment as in
Mortensen & Pissarides (1994); and staggered nominal wage contracting as in Gertler
& Trigari (2009). It then analyzes the effects of oil price increases on the economy.
The model recovers most of the well-known stylized facts observed after the oil shock
in the 2000s’. A sensitivity analysis shows that the reduction of the bargaining power
of households to negotiate wage contracts reduces the impact of an oil shock in unem-
ployment, without affecting negatively gdp. However, it also shows that the reduction
of bargaining power, together with wage flexibility strongly reduces the increase in
unemployment after an oil shock, but causes a decrease in real wages, which reduces
household income and affects gdp.
JEL Codes: D58, E24, E32, Q43
Keywords: New-Keynesian Model, dsge, oil, ces, Match & Search models, Unemploy-
ment.
1 Introduction
In the two recession periods that occurred in the United States in the 1970s’, oil prices
reached a secular peak just prior to an economic contraction. However in the last oil
shock of the 2000s’, it seems that this typical characteristic vanished. Despite the large
increase in oil prices from the beginning of 2002 until mid-2008, the effects on inflation
were less striking than the ones observed in the 1970s’ and the effects in growth as well as
in unemployment were just visible in the aftermath of the sub-prime crisis.
The study of oil shocks and its macroeconomic effects is not a new subject. The
literature has already studied the various transmission channels through which oil price
increases may have an impact on economic activity: growth, inflation, and unemployment.
∗Email: veronica.acurio-vasconez@malix.univ-paris1.fr, Universite´ Paris-1, Panthe´on-Sorbonne, Maison des
Sciences Economiques, 106-112 Boulevard de l’Hoˆpital, 75013 Paris
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If we focus on unemployment, in his seminal work, Hamilton (1983) raised doubts about
the proposition that the correlation between oil shocks and future levels of unemployment
is a coincidence. Later on, Hamilton (1988) constructed a General Equilibrium Model of
Unemployment and the Business Cycle and showed that energy price increases could be the
source of fluctuations in aggregate employment and could exert large effects on real output.
Rotemberg & Woodford (1996) estimated the responses of private sector output and real
wages to oil price increases over the period 1947-1980 and found that private output and
real wages do indeed decline following a rise in oil prices. A one percent increase in oil prices
results in a reduction in output of about 0.25 percent after five-seven quarters and a decline
in real wages, with a maximum decline of about 0.10 percent occurring only in the second
year. Those authors constructed as well a one-sector stochastic growth model and showed
that imperfectly competitive models can explain the estimated effect of oil price increases
on output and real wages to a much greater extent than can a stochastic growth model
that assumes a perfectly competitive product market. Carruth et al. (1998) developed an
efficiency-wage model and show that a simple framework based of only two prices, real
price of oil and real rate of interest, is able to explain the main postwar movements in
the rate of U.S. joblessness. Davis & Haltiwanger (2001) studied the effects of oil price
shocks on the creation and destruction of U.S. manufacturing jobs from 1972 to 1988 using
a var approach and showed that oil shocks account for 20-25 percent of the variability in
employment growth. In a recent work, Lo¨schel & Oberndorfer (2009) analyzed oil price
impacts on unemployment for Germany within the framework of a vector autoregression
(var) and found as well a positive relationship between oil shocks and unemployment
increases.
Nevertheless it seems that the interest in oil shocks and unemployment has decreased
since the mid-1990s, which is understandable given the relative steady unemployment rate
between 1995 and 2006, with the exception of 2001. However the rate of unemployment rose
by 5 per cent between 2007 and 2010, which is comparable with the 4 percent unemployment
increase some quarters after the oil shocks in the 1970s’. While the influence of the sub-
prime crisis of 2008 on the high unemployment rate observed in 2010 cannot be denied, we
should also not dismiss the effects of oil price shocks and postulate that what happened in
2008 was entirely due to a market anomaly. The objective of this paper is to address this
issue by laying the grounds of a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model (dsge),
which could be used as a tool for policy analysis.
In this particular field of dsge modelization with oil, Blanchard & Gal´ı (2007), Blan-
chard & Riggi (2013), and the models developed in Acurio-Va´sconez et al. (2015) and
Acurio-Va´sconez (2015), among others, have constructed dsge models that introduce oil
in consumption and production. However, none of these models allows for unemployment.
They all understand labor as hours worked and assume full employment. On the other
hand, the recent literature related to unemployment is based on Gertler & Trigari (2009)
(gt thereafter) and Gertler et al. (2008). These models use the unemployment dynam-
ics introduced by Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) and add staggered multi-period wage
contracting, features that have proven to better fit unemployment and wage dynamics.
With this in mind, this paper constructs a calibrated dsge model with these three
elements (unemployment, staggered multi-period wage contracting, and oil) and then an-
alyzes the impact of an oil shock. The model relies on the unemployment dynamics as in
Mortensen & Pissarides (1994), with staggered multi-period wage contracting as in Gertler
& Trigari (2009). It also assumes a small open economy where oil is imported from a foreign
country at an exogenous real price and used in consumption and production. Furthermore,
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as in Acurio-Va´sconez (2015), the model allows for oil imperfect substitutability. Finally
the model also includes staggered good prices as in Gertler et al. (2008) and Blanchard &
Gal´ı (2010).
The economy consists of three sectors: Households, Firms, and Government. The
oil and capital markets have exogenous prices. The intermediate firm market will be
considered as perfectly competitive. However, the retailers’ market is monopolistic, thus
as in Calvo (1983), just a fraction of firms are able to renegotiate prices. In contrast to
models without unemployment, labor in this paper will be traded in a process that exhibits
search externalities for individual households and vacancy openness for firms.
I assume that there exists a representative household with a continuum of members
of measure unity, who put their income in a pool and lets the head of the family self-
insure their consumption path against unemployment risk. A fraction of them work for the
intermediate firms and earn a salary. The remaining part searches for a job and receives
unemployment “benefits”. Besides, the family has a diversified ownership stake in firms,
which pay out profits, pays lump-sum taxes, consumes final domestic goods and oil, invests
in government bonds, for which it receives a nominal interest rate and invests in capital,
which is rented to firms at a real rental rate of capital.
There are two kinds of firms. Intermediate good producers and Final good firms (or
retailers). I assume that all intermediate good firms are price-takers and use labor, oil
and capital to produce their goods that are sold to the retailers. Each of them also posts
vacancies in order to attract new workers for the next period. Posting vacancies has a
quadratic cost. The representative intermediate firm maximizes its profit by choosing
quantities of oil, capital, hours of work, and vacancies. In addition to that, a fraction of
the intermediate firms can bargain with the households in order to fix a new wage. This
negotiation will be done in a Nash bargaining framework. The retailers on the other hand
are monopolistic firms and a fraction of them is able to re-optimize its price at each period.
Finally, there is a Government sector that has exogenous spending and a Central Bank
that sets the nominal short-term interest rate.
Under the baseline calibration, the model recovers most of the well-known stylized facts
after an oil price shock in the 2000s’: the absent of recession, coupled with a low increase
in domestic inflation, a low price elasticity of oil demand, and in this particular model,
an increase in unemployment. Here, as in Acurio-Va´sconez (2015), capital and labor are
not perfectly substitutes for oil, then an oil price shock induces the reduction in hiring
cost which in turn decreases the quantity of vacancies that the firm posts in order to
attract new workers. This provokes the increase in unemployment. A sensitivity analysis
shows that the reduction of the bargaining power of households to negotiate wage contracts
could diminish the raise in unemployment after an oil shock without affecting negatively
gdp. However, it also shows that the reduction of bargaining power, together with wage
flexibility strongly reduces the increase in unemployment after an oil shock, but causes a
decrease in real wages, which reduces household income and affects gdp.
The rest of the paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 describes the basic charac-
teristics of the model. Section 3 analyzes the impulse response functions and performs a
sensitivity analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
In the same way as in Acurio-Va´sconez (2015), I consider an oil-imported small open
economy with ces functions in production and consumption. Along with this framework
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this paper introduces unemployment as in Mortensen & Pissarides (1994); hiring costs and
staggered wages are introduced following Gertler & Trigari (2009) (for now on GT). Then,
within the framework of the model developed in Acurio-Va´sconez (2015), this model is a
variation of the Mortensen-Pissarides Search and Matching model, which as in gt allows
for staggered multi-period wage contracting.
Households and firms interact in three markets, the exchange of goods, oil, and cap-
ital markets. Capital, oil and intermediate firm markets will be considered as perfectly
competitive and the retailers (or final good firms) will interact in a monopolistic market.
2.1 Households
I assume that there exists a representative household with a continuum of members of
measure unity. Denote Lt ∈ (0, 1) the share of family members currently employed at time
t.1 In order to introduce complete consumption insurance, I will assume as in Merz (1995),
that all the family members put their income in a pool and let the head of the family
optimally choose per capita consumption and asset holdings. Under this assumption, each
family member self-insures its consumption path against unemployment risk.
Each member of the family who is working at firm i, works Tt(i) hours, and earns
a nominal wage, Wt(i). I adopt the hypothesis of full participation as in most of the
new Keynesian models with unemployment, meaning that I assume that the remaining
fraction of family members that are not working, 1−Lt, are searching for a job and receive
unemployment benefits, b, financed through lump-sum taxes.
Households can consume two different types of goods: a domestic good, Cq,t, at nominal
price Pq that is produced inside the country
2 and oil, Ce,t, which comes from a foreign
country, at nominal price Pe. The consumption flow of household j is defined as in Acurio-
Va´sconez (2015) by:
Ct :=
(
(1− xc)1−σcCσcq,t + x1−σcc Cσce,t
) 1
σc (1)
where Cq,t :=
(∫ 1
0 Cq,t(j)
p−1
p
) p
p−1
is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, where j ∈ [0, 1] indexes
the type of good; xc represents the share of oil consumption out of total consumption
3
and σc =
ηc−1
ηc
where ηc is the elasticity of substitution between domestic goods and oil
consumption.
The optimal allocation expenditure among these different goods, subject to the budget
constraint Pc,tCt = Pq,tCq,t +Pe,tCe,t, where Pc,t stands for the CPI price index
4, gives the
following consumption demand functions and the equation for the CPI index (Cf. Acurio-
Va´sconez (2015)):
Cq,t(j) = (1− xc)
(
Pq,t
Pc,t
) 1
σc−1
Ct(j), Ce,t(j) = xc
(
Pe,t
Pc,t
) 1
σc−1
Ct(j) (2)
Pc,t =
(
(1− xc)P
σc
σc−1
q,t + xcP
σc
σc−1
e,t
)σc−1
σc
(3)
1Then employment is different from hours worked
2Pq could be interpreted as being the CPI without gasoline and other energy goods.
3Cf. Appendix Acurio-Va´sconez (2015) for details in the calculation.
4Defined as the minimum expenditure required to buy one unit of Ct.
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Moreover, the family has a diversified ownership stake in firms, which pay out profits,
Πt, pays lump-sum taxes, Taxt, consumes, Ct, invests in government bonds, Bt, for which
it receives a nominal interest rate, it, and invest in capital, It, which is rented to firms at
a real rental rate of capital, rkt . Then conditional on Lt(i) and Tt(i) it seeks to maximize
the following lifetime discounted utility function:
Wt = U(Ct)−
∫ 1
0
V (Tt(i))Lt(i)di+ βEtWt+1
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and
U(Ct) = ln(Ct) and V (Tt(i)) =
Tt(i)
1+w˜
1 + w˜
It does so under the following budget constraint:
Pc,tCt + Pk,tIt +Bt ≤ (4)
≤ (1 + it−1)Bt−1+
∫ 1
0
Wt(i)Lt(i)di+ (1− Lt)Pq,tb+ Πt + rkt Pk,tKt + Taxt
The time path considered here is a month, then note that, with this construction, Wt
represents a monthly wage.5 I assume that the dynamics of capital accumulation follows:
It := Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate.
The first order conditions with respect to Ct, Bt and Kt+1 are:
6
Ct : U
′(Ct) = λtPc,t (5)
Bt : λt = βEt [(1 + it)λt+1] (6)
Kt+1 : λtPk,t = βEt
[
λt+1
(
rkt+1 + 1− δ
)
Pk,t+1
]
(7)
Following Thomas (2008) and gt, hours per worker will be determined by firm and
worker in a privately efficient way. They will maximize the joint surplus of their employment
relationship.
2.2 Matching, Vacancies, and Unemployment
Assume that each intermediate firm indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] employs Lt(i) workers at time t.
It also post Vt(i) vacancies in order to attract new workers for the next period of operation.
Before production starts and following Mortensen & Pissarides (1994), assume that ρLt−1
jobs that are not matched are destroyed. The parameter ρ represents then the rate of
destruction or separation rate, which will be assumed constant.7 Workers that have lost
their jobs at time t− 1 start searching immediately and can still be hired at time t for the
5I adopt the same assumption as in Thomas (2008).
6λt(j) being the Lagrangian multiplier. Cf. Acurio-Va´sconez et al. (2015) for details on the derivation
7As pointed out by gt within this framework, fluctuations in unemployment come from the cyclical
variation in hiring and not from fluctuations in the separation rate, a fact corroborated in U.S. labor
market. Cf. Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005).
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next period.8 The total number of employed workers and vacancies are Lt :=
∫ 1
0 Lt(i)di
and Vt :=
∫ 1
0 Vt(i)di respectively. Accordingly, the law of motion of aggregate employment
is then:
Lt = (1− ρ)Lt−1 +Mt−1 (8)
where Mt represents the number of job aggregate matches that are made at time t. Then
the total number of unemployed workers, who are searching for a job, St, is given by:
St : = 1− Lt
= 1− Lt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
+ ρLt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
− Mt︸︷︷︸
(c)
Then unemployment is composed by (a) unemployed workers at time t, plus (b) workers
who have lost their jobs at the end of time t-1, minus (c) the matches at time t that could
include workers that lost their jobs at the end of time t-1.
Remark that the distinction between being unemployed and not being in the labor force
is ignored with this assumption. Then full participation is guaranteed (i.e at all times, all
individuals are either employed or looking for a job).
Define now:
q˜t :=
Mt
Vt
, θt :=
Vt
St
and zt :=
Mt
St
then q˜t represents the probability a firm fills a vacancy in period t, which could be inter-
preted as the probability of transition from unfilled vacancy to a filled one; θt is a measure
of the tightness of the labor market and zt represents the probability an unemployed worker
find a job, i.e the probability of transition from unemployment to employment. I assume
that the probabilities q˜t and zt are taken as given by both firms and workers.
2.3 Intermediate Goods Firms
Assume that there exists a continuum of perfectly competitive intermediate goods produc-
ers indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] that produce an homogeneous good Qt(i) through a nested ces
production function involving oil, capital, and labor as in Acurio-Va´sconez (2015) defined
by:
Qt(i) :=
(
xp(AE,tEt(i))
σp + (1− xp)(ALK,t(Kt(i)α (Tt(i)Lt(i))1−α))σp
)1/σp
where Et(i) is the quantity of oil used, Kt(i) is the capital rented, Lt(i) is the amount of
labor rented by the intermediate firm i and, Tt(i) is the total of hours provided by each
worker at firm i. AE,t and ALK,t represent respectively a measure of oil productivity and
the total factor productivity (tfp), which measures the productivity of the combination of
labor and capital. The “share” of capital in the composite factor is measured by α ∈ [0, 1]
and σp =
ηp−1
ηp
, with ηp being the elasticity of substitution between the utilization of oil
and the composite factor (of capital and labor). Finally, xp is a distribution parameter.
As remarked in Cantore & Levine (2012) one can rewrite this equation as:
Qt(i) :=
(
αe
(
AE,tEt(i)
AEE
)σp
+ (1− αe)
(
ALK,tKt(i)
α (Tt(i)Lt(i))
1−α
ALKKα (TL)
1−α
)σp)1/σp
(9)
8Under this assumption workers that have been hired at time t become productive at time t + 1. This
assumption is well accepted whenever the time period is one month.
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where variables without a time subscript represent the steady state of the equally named
variable. As proved in Acurio-Va´sconez (2015), with this normalization αe is the oil’s out-
put elasticity at steady state. I assume that both technologies shocks are AR(1) processes:
ln(AE,t) = ρaeln(AE,t−1) + eae, ln(ALK,t) = ρalkln(ALK,t−1) + ealk
eae ∼ N (0, σ2ae), ealk ∼ N (0, σ2alk)
For simplicity I assume that capital and oil are perfectly mobile across firms and that
there is a competitive market in oil and capital. The intermediate firm sells this good Qt(i)
to the final good firm at the perfectly competitive real price P rq :=
Pq,t(i)
Pq,t
where Pq,t is the
aggregate final good price.
As mentioned before, each firm enters the market with Lt−1(i) quantity of employees,
and each follows the same law of motion defined in (8):
Lt+1 := (1− ρ)Lt +Mt
where Mt :=
∫ 1
0 Mt(i)di denotes the aggregate matches in period t. Assume that the
aggregate matching process follows:
Mt := ψS
γ
t V
1−γ
t
where ψ is a scale parameter that captures the efficiency of the search and matching process.
Because firms post vacancies, there are hiring costs that introduce employment adjust-
ments. These adjustments introduce time frictions in the process in which households and
firms exchange labor and give sense to the bargaining problem between firms and workers.
Accordingly, denote Xt(i) the hiring rate, i.e, the percent change in the firm’s workforce
from t to t+ 1, as the ratio of new hires, q˜tVt(i), to the existing workforce Lt(i), then:
Xt(i) :=
q˜tVt(i)
Lt(i)
(10)
Note that by the law of large numbers, Xt(i) is known with certainty at time t, since
q˜t is known with certainty at time t. Then the total workforce could be expressed as the
sum of the surviving workers (1− ρ)Lt and the new hires q˜tVt, thus one has:
Lt+1(i) := (1− ρ+Xt(i))Lt(i) (11)
As explained before, remark that this time assumption reflects the fact that new hires
start to work one period after being hired.9
As discussed in gt and Thomas (2008), in order to introduce staggered wages rigidities,
it is necessary to consider convex vacancy cost.10 Following gt, I assume quadratic hiring
cost (in real terms) by:
κ
2
X2t (i)Lt(i)
where κ is the cost of adjustment parameter, which I suppose constant across time.
9This assumption has been used in numerous papers as gt, Thomas (2008), Groshenny (2013), among
others.
10As explained in gt, the staggered wage setting introduces dispersion of wages across firms in equilibrium,
convex hiring cost ensures that, at equilibrium, every firm posts vacancies, so that the equilibrium is
deterministic
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Firms maximize profits. In order to study this problem, I will divide it into three
stages: (1) Each firm i takes all prices, including the nominal current wage Wt(i), the
demand Qt(i), the probability of filling a vacancy q˜t and its existing employment stock as
given and then it chooses quantities of oil, Et(i), capital, Kt(i) and the hiring rate Xt(i),
by posting vacancies, in order to maximize its real profit; (2) Firms and workers determine
the quantity of hours by maximizing the joint surplus of their employment relationship
and; (3) The firm will bargain, if it can, with the households, in order to fix the wage,
solving a Nash bargaining problem.
Let us denote Λt,t+1 :=
λt+1
λt
, where λt is the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the
household problem. Denote Ft(i) the present real value of firm i, i.e:
Ft (i) := P
r
q,tQt(i)−Wr,t(i)Lt(i)− rkt Sk,tKt(i)− Se,tEt(i)−
κ
2
X2t (i)Lt(i) + βEt [Λt,t+1Ft+1]
(12)
where Wr,t(i) :=
Wt(i)
Pq,t
is the real wage paid by the firm i, Sk,t :=
Pk,t
Pq,t
the real price
of capital and Se,t =
Pe,t
Pq,t
, the real price of oil.11 The real prices of oil and capital are
considered exogenous and given by:
ln(Se,t) := ρseln(Se,t−1) + ee,t, ln(Sk,t) := ρskln(Sk,t−1) + ek,t
where ee,t ∼ N (0, σ2e) and ek,t ∼ N (0, σ2k) are Gaussian white noises.
The first order conditions with respect to Et(i) and Kt(i) give:
Et(i) : Se,t = P
r
q,txpA
σp
E,t
(
Et(i)
Qt(i)
)σp−1
(13)
Kt(i) : r
k
t Sk,t = P
r
q,tα(1− xp)AσpLK,t
(
Kt(i)
Qt(i)
)ασp−1(Lt(i)
Qt(i)
)(1−α)σp
(14)
Then the first-order condition with respect to Kt(i) and Et(i) equalizes the marginal
revenue product of capital and oil to their respective real price.
Using these equations one can derive the following expression:
rkt Sk,t = αP
r
q,t
Qt(i)
Kt(i)
− αSe,tEt(i)
Kt(i)
(15)
Given constant returns to scale in production and perfect capital and oil mobility, all
firms choose the same capital-output ratio and the same oil-output ratio. This implies
that the marginal product of labor is defined by Γt(i) :=
∂Qt(i)
∂L¯t(i)
, where L¯t(i) = Lt(i)Tt(i)
is equalized across firms as well. Then one has Γt(i) = Γt, for all i.
Let Jt(i) be the real value of the firm for adding another worker at time t after adjust-
ment costs are sunk. Remark that Jt(i) could be interpreted as being the firm surplus and
it is equal to the partial derivative of Ft(i) with respect to Lt(i) holding Xt(i) fixed. Then
Jt(i) is given by:
Jt(i) =P
r
q,tTt(i)Γt −Wr,t(i)−
κ
2
X2t (i) + β(1− ρ+Xt(i))EtΛt,t+1Jt+1(i) (16)
11Note that the intermediate firm acts in a perfectly competitive market, so it cannot impose the price.
The staggered prices will be included in the final good firm process.
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Remark that firms choose Lt(i) by setting Xt(i), or equivalently, by choosing Vt(i).
Then the first order condition for vacancy posting equates the marginal cost of adding a
worker with the discounted marginal benefit. Then one has:
κXt(i) = βEtΛt,t+1Jt+1(i) (17)
Using equation (16), one can derive the following relationship for the hiring rate:
Xt(i) =
β
κ
EtΛt,t+1
[
P rq,tΓt+1Tt+1(i)−Wr,t+1(i) +
κ
2
X2t+1(i) + (1− ρ)κXt+1(i)
]
(18)
which is a forward looking difference equation for the hiring rate. The hiring rate depends
thus on a discounted steam of the firm’s expected surplus from the marginal worker which
is the real marginal product of labor times hours worked minus the real wage (the net
earning at the margin), plus the saving on adjustment cost κ2X
2
t+1(i).
Define Dt(i) the real value to a worker working at firm i and define Ut the value of total
unemployment at time t. Remark that these two values are defined after hiring decisions
at time t have been made. One then has:
Dt(i) := Wr,t(i)− V (Tt)
U ′(Ct)
+ βEtΛt,t+1 ((1− ρ)Dt+1(i) + ρUt+1) (19)
The value Dt(i) depends on the real salary specific to firm i, plus the disutility in
consumption units, plus the discounted value generated if it remains employed or not in
the subsequent period.
Let us define:
Dx,t :=
∫ 1
0
Dt(i)
Xt−1(i)Lt−1(i)
Xt−1Lt−1
di (20)
the average value of employment conditional on being a new worker at time t. Then the
subscript x is for the average taken from new workers, i.e those who have been hired at
period t− 1. Then the real value of unemployment, denoted Ut, is given by:
Ut := b+ βEtΛt,t+1 (ztDx,t+1 + (1− zt)Ut+1)
then, as in the case of value of a worker at firm i, Ut is defined by the unemployment
compensation plus the discounted value restraint to the probability that the worker will
find a job or not in the subsequent period.
Note that the value of finding a job next period for a worker currently unemployed at
time t is Dx,t+1, which is the average value of working next period. Then as pointed out
by gt, unemployed workers do not have a prior knowledge of which firm might be paying
higher wages next period.
With these two notions, one can define the worker surplus at firm i, denoted Ht(i), and
the average worker surplus conditional on being a new hire, denoted Hx,t by:
Ht(i) := Dt(i)− Ut, Hx,t := Dx,t − Ut
Combining these equations one has the following relationship for the worker surplus at
firm i:
Ht(i) = Wr,t(i)− b− V (Tt(i))
U ′(Ct)
+ βEtΛt,t+1 (χHt+1(i)− ztHx,t+1) (21)
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where χ = 1− ρ.
Then the worker’s contribution to the welfare of the family depends on the real salary
earned if she/he works in firm i, minus what she/he looses if she/he works, plus her/his
future contribution if she/he is not separated next period, minus the value incurred if
she/he is searching for a job.
In the second step, as remarked by Thomas (2008), hours per worker are determined
by firms and workers by maximizing the joint surplus of their employment relationship, i.e
they maximize over Tt the sum the household surplus Ht(i), and the firm surplus, Jt(i),
which leads to the following first order condition:
P rq,tΓt =
V ′(Tt(i))
U ′(Ct)
= Tt(i)
w˜Ct (22)
i.e, hours adjust to the point where the marginal value product of labor P rq,tΓt equals the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure for the worker. Because the
marginal product of labor is the same for all producers, then hours across producers has to
be also the same, i.e Tt(i) = Tt for all i. Note that hours are independent of the monthly
wage. The wage however will depend on the hours worked.
2.4 Wage Setting
Staggered Nash wage bargaining is introduced as in gt. First, as in Calvo (1983), let us
suppose that each period, a fraction of firms (1− θw) renegotiates its wage contracts, and
its adjustment is independent of its history, meaning that firms do not need to know their
history on being capable or not to renegotiate wages.
Assume also that while the duration of the contract of each firm does remains uncertain,
the aggregate duration is 11−θw . This way θw could be interpreted as being a wage stickiness
measure parameter.
For simplicity, I assume that firms which cannot renegotiate their wage contract at time
t, take the nominal wage as it was in the last period, i.e Wt(i) = Wt−1(i). Additionally,
assume that those firms who are able to renegotiate wage contracts at time t, bargain with
their respective existing workforce, which includes the recent new hires. Thus, workers
hired in between contract periods receive the same wage as existing workers.12
Let W ot (i) be the wage of the firm i that renegotiates its contract at date t. When
renegotiating wage contracts, firms face the same problem. Hence they all set the same
wage. Thus the choice of W ot does not depend on i. Assuming Nash bargaining, the
contract wage W ot is chosen, so as to solve the following problem:
max
Wt(i)
Ht(i)
ηJt(i)
1−η,
subject to : Wt(i) =
{
Wt−1(i), with proba θw
W ot , with proba (1− θw)
where η ∈ [0, 1] is the worker’s relative bargaining power, assumed to be constant across
time, and where Jt(i) and Ht(i) are defined by (16) and (21) respectively.
12As pointed out by gt, constant returns to scale guarantees that bargaining with individual marginal
workers is equivalent to bargaining with a union maximizing average worker surplus. The wage is chosen in
such a way that the firm and the marginal worker share the surplus from the marginal match. For further
discussion on the validation of this assumption, please refer to Gertler et al. (2008), Thomas (2008) and
references therein.
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The first-order necessary condition for the Nash bargaining solution is given by:
ηξtJt(r) = (1− η)Σt(r)H(r) (23)
where Jt(r) and Ht(r) represent the firm’s and worker’s surplus for a firm renegotiating
its wage at time t respectively, which exact expressions can be found in the Appendix
(equations (33) and (34)), and:
ξt :=
∂Ht(r)
∂W ot
Pq,t, Σt(r) := −∂Jt(r)
∂W ot
Pq,t
Remark that ξt is the effect of a rise in the contract wage on the worker surplus and
Σt(r) is the opposite of the effect of a rise in the contract wage on the firm’s surplus. Using
the exact values of ξt and Σt(r) one can note that Σt(r) > ξ on average. As remarked by
gt, this implies that shifts in the contract wage have a larger impact in absolute value on
firm’s surplus than on worker’s surplus.
For a further analysis, let us rewrite the Nash condition by:
νt(r)Jt(r) = (1− νt(r))Ht(r) (24)
where:
νt(r) :=
η
η + (1− η)Σt(r)ξ
(25)
Using the expressions of Jt(r) and Ht(r), one can derive the following relationship for
the wage dynamics:
Et∆tW or,t = EtW tart (r) + βχθwEt∆t+1Λt,t+1W or,t+1 (26)
where:
W tart (r) := Et
[
νt(r)
(
P rq,tΓtTt +
κ
2
X2t (r)
)
+ (1− νt(r))
(
b+
V (Tt)
U ′(Ct)
+ βΛt,t+1ztHx,t+1
)]
(27)
Note that in the case of full flexibility, θw = 0, the ratio
Σ(r)
ξ equals 1 and so νt(r) = η.
Then one recovers the conventional case of period-by period wage bargaining in the case
without staggered wages.
2.5 The Final Good Firm (Retailers)
As in Gertler et al. (2008) and Blanchard & Gal´ı (2010), let me introduce staggered prices,
via the final good producers. Suppose that there exists a continuum of monopolistically
final good producers indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Each final good firm uses the intermediate goods
produced by the representative intermediate firm described in Section 2.3, and transforms
one unit of intermediate good in a differentiated final good to be resold to the households
or exported in exchange for oil. Let us denote Q˜t(j) the quantity of output sold by the
final good firm j and Pq,t its nominal price. Each final good firm has the following CES
production function:
Q˜t :=
(∫ 1
0
Q˜t(j)
εp−1
εp dj
) εp
εp−1
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Each final good producer maximizes its profit in two steps. First, given the aggregate
domestic price Pq,t and the aggregate demand Q˜t, it chooses a quantity of output Q˜t(j).
The first order condition of this problem gives the demand addressed to each retailer j:
Q˜t(j) =
(
Pq,t(j)
Pq,t
)−εp
Q˜t (28)
In the second step, the final good firm, being a monopolistically one, chooses prices
Pq,t(j) in order to maximize its profits. As in Calvo (1983), let us assume that there is
a fraction (1 − θp) of final good firms that can re-optimize their prices at time t. Denote
P oq,t(j) this re-optimized price. The rest of the firms that cannot reset their prices, leave
them as the period before (i.e Pq,t = Pq,t−1). As in the case of wages, 11−θp represents the
average duration of the price contract and so θp could be interpreted as a price stickiness
measure.
Using equation (28) one can derive an expression for the final good price aggregator:
Pq,t =
(∫ 1
0
(Pq,t(j))
1−εpdj
) 1
1−εp
Firms that are able to re-optimize prices will choose the same price, because all of them
face the same problem. Then one has the following Calvo aggregate equation:
P
1−εp
q,t = (1− θp)(P oq,t)1−εp + θpP 1−εpq,t−1
The maximization of the intertemporal profit leads to the following equation:
Et
[
+∞∑
k=0
(βθp)
kΛt,t+kQ˜
o
t+k
(
P oq,t
Pq,t+k
− εp
εp − 1P
r
q,t+k
)]
= 0
In the case of flexible prices (θp = 0), one has:
P rq,t =
ε− 1
εp
=
1
Mp
where Mp is the price markup.
Note that producing Q˜t(j) units of final good j requires Qt(i) units of intermediate
good i which is purchased from the intermediate firm at real price P rq,t. Therefore P
r
q,t
represents the real marginal cost for the production of final goods.
2.6 GDP, Monetary Policy and Government
I define nominal gdp at time t by:
Sc,tYt := P
r
q,tQt − Se,tEt −
κ
2
∫ 1
0
X2t (i)Lt(i)di
Note that with this assumption gdp is the value added of production.13
13See Blanchard & Gal´ı (2007) and Acurio-Va´sconez et al. (2015) for further discussion on this assumption.
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Let Πq,t :=
Pq,t
Pq,t−1 be the domestic inflation. Suppose that the Central Bank sets the
nominal short-term interest rate, it, by the following monetary policy:
1 + it
1 + i
=
(
1 + it−1
1 + i
)ρi
(Πq,t)
φpi
(
Yt
Y
)φy
εi,t,
where ln(εi,t) = ρiln(εi,t−1) + ei,t with ei,t ∼ N (0, σ2i ).
Finally, the Government budget constraint is given by:
(1 + it−1)Bt−1 +Gt = Bt + Tt + b,
where Gt stands for the nominal government spending. I assume that the real government
spending Gr,t =
Gt
Pq,t is an exogenous process given by:
ln(Gr,t) = (1− ρg)(ln(ωQ)) + ρg ln(Gr,t−1) + ρalk,gealk,t + ρae,geae,t + eg,t
where ω represents the share that the government takes from the total output (Qt) for its
own spending, Q represent the steady state of Qt, and eg,t ∼ N (0, σ2g) is a Gaussian white
noise.
3 Model Evaluation
3.1 Calibration
In what follows, I assume a monthly frequency for the model. As pointed out by gt, a
month calibration properly capture the high rate of job finding in U.S.data14. Aggregation
and the steady state calculation are shown in the Appendix.
There exists 19 structural parameters in the model, in addition to those related to
shocks. Four of these parameters are conventional in the Business Cycle literature for U.S:
the discount factor, β, is set at 0.99
1
3 , the depreciation rate, δ, is set at 0.0253 the government
spending output share, ω, is fixed at 0.18 and the price markup at steady state,Mp, is set
at 87 . There are also four parameters that are specific to the Nash bargaining process and
the search and matching framework. I calibrate them as in gt. The monthly separation
rate, ρ, is fixed at 0.035. This choice implies that jobs last about 212 years on average.
The elasticity of matches to unemployment, γ, is set at 0.515. The scale parameter that
captures the efficiency of the search and matching process, ψ, is normalized at 1. The
bargaining power parameter, η, is set at 0.5. The average probability of finding a job, z,
is set at 0.46 following the results obtained by Shimer (2005) for the U.S.average monthly
job-finding rate. As shown in the Appendix in equation (44) the unemployment benefits,
b, can be calibrated if one calibrates b˜, which is defined as the ratio of the unemployment
flow value, b + V (Tt)U ′(Ct) , to the steady state flow contribution of the worker to the match
(P rq ΓTt +
κ
2X
2). The calibration of b˜ is controversial. Shimer (2005) calibrated it at 0.4,
Hall (2009) proposes a value of 0.7 and the Bayesian estimation performed in Gertler et al.
14This time path fits with the assumption that workers that have lost their jobs in time t − 1 starts
searching immediately and can still be hired at time t, but start working in the next period. Also, as
emphasized by Thomas (2008), monetary policy decisions in the U.S.Federal Reserve are at least eight per
year, then a monthly calibration is better to treat this problem.
15As pointed out by gt, this value is in the range of plausible ones, reported in Petrongolo & Pissarides
(2001) survey
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(2008) yields 0.73 for this parameter, close to the one in Hall (2009). However, their
estimation recovers also a value of 0.9 for η, which is out of the range of this parameter,
usually between 0.4 and 0.7. In order to be as close as possible to the literature, I calibrate
this parameter at 0.5, which is the prior mean chosen by Gertler et al. (2008) for their
Bayesian estimation. Also following gt, I calibrate the probability that a firm may not
renegotiate the wage contract at 8/9, which assume that wages are on average renegotiated
each 9 months. Finally, following gt and Thomas (2008), I set the hiring cost as a fraction
of domestic output in steady state, κX
2L
2Q , at 1 percent.
For the Taylor rule coefficients, I use the calibration of Sveen & Weinke (2008), then
the response to inflation, φpi, the response to the output, φy, and the persistence of the
Taylor rule, φi, are set at 1.5,
0.5
12 , and 0.7
1
3 respectively.
Remaining values are calibrated using the estimated values of Acurio-Va´sconez (2015).
Then the share of oil consumption for households, xc, oil’s output elasticity at steady state,
αe, oil’s elasticities of substitution, ηc and ηp, are calibrated at 0.0286, 0.0597, 0.5056 and
0.1387 respectively. The capital “share,” α, is fixed at 0.3607 and the price rigidity, θp, is
calibrated at 0.5164
1
3 . Finally, the AR(1) autoregressive parameters are at the power 13 .
Parameters’ calibration is summarized in Table 1 for the structural parameters, and in
Table 2 for the autoregressive parameters.
Table 1: Structural Parameters Calibration
Parameter Calibration Parameter Calibration
Discount factor β 0.99
1
3 Calvo wage parameter θw
8
9
Depreciation rate δ 0.0253 Taylor rule response to inflation φpi 1.5
Markup Mp
8
7 Taylor rule response to output φy
0.5
12
Gov. spending output share ω 0.18 Taylor rule persistence φi 0.7
1/3
Separation rate ρ 0.035 Dist. parameter in consump. xc 0.0286
Elast. of matches to unemployment γ 0.5 Oil’s output elasticity αe 0.0597
Scale efficiency matching ψ 1 Elast. substitution in production ηp 0.1387
Bargaining power η 0.5 Elast. substitution in consump. ηp 0.5056
Steady state prob. of finding a job z 0.46 “Share” parameter on capital α 0.3607
b˜ 0.5 Calvo price parameter θp 0.5164
1/3
Table 2: AR(1) Coefficients Calibration
Parameter Calibration Parameter Calibration
Real oil price ρse 0.9565
1
3 Oil productivity ρae 0.6576
1
3
Real capital price ρsk 0.9221
1
3 TFP ρalk 0.7334
1
3
Government ρg 0.8910
1
3 Oil Prod. in Gov. ρae,g 0.1741
1
3
Monetary ρi 0.6576
1
3 TFP in Gov. ρalk,g 0.5944
1
3
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3.2 Simulations and Results
Figure 1 presents the impulse response functions (thereafter irfs) of the economy to a two-
percent increase in the real price of oil16. The model recovers most of the responses obtained
with the model developed in Acurio-Va´sconez (2015): the small but persistent increase in
domestic inflation, the increase in hours worked, the muted response of oil in production
and the short lived increase in investment and domestic output. The transmission channel
for these responses are explained in Acurio-Va´sconez (2015). With respect to the responses
of the new variables introduced in this paper, one can observe that an increase in the real
price of oil provokes a rise in unemployment that stagnates one year after the shock. This
effect is explained as follows. Because of the low substitutability of oil, an increase in
its price obligates firms to reduce cost somewhere else, hence one observes a decrease in
hiring cost, which translates into a contemporaneous decrease in vacant posts. This then
provokes the rise in unemployment. Note that firms could try to reduce costs by reducing
wages instead of hiring cost. However after an oil shock, workers need as well more income
to maintain their consumption level, so they bargain for higher wages. Then firms prefer
to demand more hours of work, which will increase wages, but they reduce vacant posts.
It is worth noticing that one observes an increase in real wages, rather than a decrease,
in contrast with what was found in Acurio-Va´sconez (2015). However, the labor market
modelization is different in these two models. As explained in Acurio-Va´sconez (2015), if
oil substitutability is low, after the increase in oil prices, producers increase their labor
demand, in order to produce a larger quantity of domestic output and pay for oil; and
consumers increase their labor supply in order to pay for bills. In that particular model,
labor supply is larger than labor demand and so the interaction provokes the decrease in
real wages observed. However while in Acurio-Va´sconez (2015) labor is just hours worked,
in this model, labor is composed by hours and number of workers, then it is possible to
increase labor demand by increasing hours demand and decreasing vacancies. The increase
in hours demand and the households’ need of larger wages provoke, after the bargaining,
the increase in real wages in this model. Another important point to raise is that when
one allows for unemployment, the response of domestic output, while still increasing at the
moment of the shock, decreases by 0.14 percent one month after and continues to decrease,
in contrast with what we found in Acurio-Va´sconez (2015), where gdp came back to its
steady state three quarters after the shock.
It is worth stressing that the response of unemployment is particularly sensitive to
the calibration of two parameters: the frequency of wage renegotiation, θw, and the wage
bargaining power of households, η. The frequency of renegotiation is observable from data17
so its calibration is not problematic. The calibration of parameter η on the other hand, is
a subject of controversy. As noted by numerous authors, there is little direct evidence on
what an “appropriate” value of this parameter should be. As a sensitive exercise, let me
reduce the bargaining power from 0.5 to 0.1 and do the same exercise as before. The blue
solid line in Figure 2 represents the irfs with the baseline calibration, while the dashed
green line represents the irfs of the model where the bargaining power of households has
been diminished, ceteris paribus. As we can observe, with this change in calibration the
increase in unemployment is being reduced by 1.3 percent on average, in comparison with
the baseline calibration, while the responses of the rest of the variables do not have obvious
16I use the estimated standard deviation in Acurio-Va´sconez (2015) to facilitate comparison.
17The latest studies on the subject found that most of wages in U.S.are renegotiated once a year. See
Gottschalk (2005), Gertler et al. (2008) among others.
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Figure 1: Response to 2 Percent Increase on Real Price of Oil
changes, besides from those directly affected as wages, hiring cost and, vacancies. These
responses are explained as follows. On one hand, if households have less bargaining power
when negotiating wage contracts, even if they ask for higher wages in order to offset the
increase in oil prices, they will not be able to obtain the same wage contract as before, so
that real wages do not increase as much as before right after the shock. On the other hand,
firms still lower their hiring cost by reducing vacancies to cope with the increase in oil
prices, but because they can negotiate lower wage contracts, the reduction in hiring costs
are significantly smaller. Then unemployment increases around 2.5 percent, one year after
the shock. It appears then that the reduction of the wage bargaining power of households
could reduce the impact of an oil shock in unemployment.
This last result then raises another question: Could flexible wages18 and low bargaining
power for the households prevent the stagflatonary effects of oil shocks? In other to shed
some light to this question, let me realize one more experiment. Figure 3 represents the
irfs of the economy in two different scenarios: the baseline calibration, and one where
wages have been flexibilized (changing θw from 8/9 to 0.1), and the bargaining power of
household reduced (changing η from 0.5 to 0.1). It seems that wage flexibility has an
important effect in unemployment, preventing it from suddenly increasing after the oil
shock. This is because when wages are renegotiated frequently and workers have almost
no bargaining power, firms will be able to negotiate a lower wage contract and so reduce
production cost, without strongly reducing hiring cost, i.e without limiting vacancies. This
income reduction however reduces the rise in investment and output. Then while it seems
that the two policies together, wage flexibility and the reduction in the bargaining power of
households, could play a role on the reduction of unemployment reaction to oil shocks, but
it can also cause a decrease in household income, which will have an effect in investment
and then in gdp.
18Note that wage flexibility refers in this model to an increase in the frequency of wage negotiation.
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Figure 2: Response to 2 Percent Increase on Real Price of Oil–Bargaining Power Compar-
ison
Comparison of two models, baseline (solid blue line) and its counterpart with reduced
bargaining power (dashed green line)
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Figure 3: Response to 2 Percent Increase on Real Price of Oil—Wage Flexibility Compar-
ison
Comparison of two models, baseline (solid blue line) and its counterpart with reduced
bargaining power and flexible wages (dashed green line)
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4 Conclusion
This papers addresses the question of the effects of oil price increases into unemployment
and wage dynamics. It constructs a medium scale dsge model that mixed two fundamental
ideas: the introduction of oil in consumption and production and the recent literature on
unemployment modelization. The model is able to recover most of the well-known stylized
facts observed after the oil shock in the 2000s’. A sensitivity analysis shows that the
reduction in the bargaining power of households for wage contracts negotiation reduces
the impact of an oil shock in unemployment without negatively affecting domestic output.
However, it also shows that even though the two policies together, wage flexibility and the
reduction in the bargaining power of households, could substantially reduce the reaction
of unemployment to oil shocks, they can also cause a negative reaction in wages, affecting
negatively the income of households and consequently investment and gdp.
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A Appendix A
A.1 Firms and Workers
The problem of each firm i is:
max
Et(i),Xt(i),Kt(i),Wt(i)
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
dt,t+k
(
P rq,t+kQt+k(i)− realcost(Qt+k(i))
)]
,
subject to : Lt+k(i) = (1− ρ+Xt+k(i))Lt+k(i)
Qt+k(i) =
(
xp(AE,t+kEt+k(i))
σp + (1− xp)(ALK,t+k(Kt+k(i)αLt+k(i)1−α))σp
)1/σp
where dt,t+k is the stochastic disc out factor from date t to t+ k, defined as:
1. Stochastic discount factor from date t to date t+ 1
dt,t+1 :=
βλt
λt+1
= βΛt,t+1, Λt,t+1 =
λt
λt+1
2. Stochastic discount factor from date t to date t+ k
dt,t+k :=
βkλt
λt+k
= βkΛt+k,t
Let us denote Ft(i) the present real value of the firm i. Then we have:
Ft(i) =Etdt,t
[
P rq,tQt −Wr,t(i)Lt(i)− rkt Sk,tKt(i)− Se,tEt(i)−
κ
2
X2t (i)Lt(i)
]
+
+Etdt,t+1
[
P rq,t+1Qt+1 −Wr,t+1(i)Lt+1(i)− rkt+1Sk,t+1Kt+1(i)− Se,t+1Et+1(i)−
κ
2
X2t+1(i)Lt+1(i)
]
+...
=P rq,tQt −Wr,t(i)Lt(i)− rkt Sk,tKt(i)− Se,tEt(i)+
+βΛt,t+1
[
P rq,t+1Qt+1 −Wr,t+1(i)Lt+1(i)− rkt+1Sk,t+1Kt+1(i)− Se,t+1Et+1(i)−
κ
2
X2t+1(i)Lt+1(i)
]
+...
=P rq,tQt −Wr,t(i)Lt(i)− rkt Sk,tKt(i)− Se,tEt(i)−
κ
2
X2t (i)Lt(i) + βEtΛt,t+1Ft+1(i)
The first order condition with respect to Et(i) and Kt(i) are given by:
Et(i) :
∂
∂Et(i)
Ft(i) = 0⇔ Se,t = P rq,t
∂
∂Et(i)
Qt(i)
Kt(i) :
∂
∂Kt(i)
Ft(i) = 0⇔ rkt Sk,t = P rq,t
∂
∂Kt(i)
Qt(i)
Using these equations one can write:
rkt Sk,t =
P rq,t
Kt(i)
αQt(i)
1−σq [Qσqt (i)− Eσqt (i)]
=
P rq,t
Kt(i)
αQt(i)−
P rq,t
Kt(i)
αQ
1−σq
t (i)E
σp
t (i)
=αP rq,t
Qt(i)
Kt(i)
− αEt(i)
Kt(i)
Se,t
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Defining Jt(i) as in the paper one has:
Jt(i) :=
∂Ft(i)
∂Lt(i)
=P rq,t
∂Qt(i)
∂Lt(i)
−Wr,t(i)− ∂
∂Lt(i)
[
κ
2
(
q˜tVt(i)
Lt(i)
)2
Lt(i)
]
+ β
∂
∂Lt(i)
EtΛt,t+1Ft+1(i)
=P rq,t
∂Qt(i)
∂Lt(i)
−Wr,t(i) + κ
2
(q˜tVt(i))
2 Lt(i)
−2+
+β
∂
∂Lt(i)
EtΛt,t+1
[
P rq,t+1Qt+1(i)−Wr,t+1(i)Lt+1(i)− rkt Sk,t+1Kt+1 − Se,t+1Et+1 −
κ
2
X2t+1(i)Lt+1(i)
]
+
+ β2
∂
∂Lt(i)
EtΛt,t+2Ft+2(i)
Having Xt fixed, one has:
Jt(i) =P
r
q,tΓtTt −Wr,t(i)−
κ
2
X2t (i) + β(1− ρ+Xt(i))EtΛt,t+1Jt+1(i)
The first order condition with respect to Vt(i) gives
− ∂
∂Vt(i)
(κ
2
X2t (i)Lt(i)
)
+ P rq,t
∂Q
∂Vt(i)
−Wr,t(i)∂Lt(i)
∂Vt(i)
+ βEtΛt,t+1
∂Ft+1(i)
∂Vt(i)
= 0
Remark that:
∂
∂Vt(i)
(
κ
2
q˜2t V
2
t (i)
L2t (i)
Lt(i)
)
=
κ
Lt(i)
q˜tVt(i) = κXt(i)q˜t, and
∂Ft+1(i)
∂Vt(i)
=q˜t
∂Ft+1(i)
∂Lt+1(i)
Then one has:
κXt(i)q˜t =βEtΛt,t+1
∂Ft+1(i)
∂Lt+1(i)
q˜t
κXt(i) =βEtΛt,t+1Jt+1(i)
Using these last equations one has:
κXt(i) =βEtΛt,t+1
(
P rq,tΓt+1Tt −Wr,t+1(i)−
κ
2
X2t+1(i) + β(1− ρ+Xt+1(i))Λt+1,t+2Jt+2(i)
)
=βEtΛt,t+1
(
P rq,t+1Γt+1Tt+1 −Wr,t+1(i)−
κ
2
X2t+1(i)+
β(1− ρ)Λt+1,t+2Jt+2(i) + βXt+1(i)Λt+1,t+2Jt+2(i))
=βEtΛt,t+1
(
P rq,tΓt+1Tt+1 −Wr,t+1(i)−
κ
2
X2t+1(i) + (1− ρ)κXt+1(i) + κX2t+1(i)
)
Then we recover equation (18).
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Denote χ = 1− ρ. Using the definition of worker surplus one can write:
Ht(i) =Wr,t(i)− b− V (Tt)
U ′(Ct)
+ βEtΛt,t+1 (χDt+1(i) + (1− χ)Ut+1)
− βEtΛt,t+1 (ztDx,t+1(i) + (1− zt)Ut+1)
=Wr,t − b− V (Tt)
U ′(Ct)
+ χβEtΛt,t+1Dt+1(i) + βEtΛt,t+1Ut+1 − χβEtΛt,t+1Ut+1+
− βztEtΛt,t+1Dx,t+1 − βEtΛt,t+1Ut+1 − βztEtΛt,t+1Ut+1
=Wr,t − b− V (Tt)
U ′(Ct)
+ βχEtΛt,t+1 (Dt+1(i)− Ut+1)− βztEtΛt,t+1 (Dx,t+1 − Ut+1)
=Wr,t − b− V (Tt)
U ′(Ct)
+ βEtΛt,t+1 (χHt+1(i)− ztHx,t+1)
A.2 Firm/worker surplus for/and in a renegotiating firm
One can rewrite equation (16) as:
Jt(i) = Et
+∞∑
k=0
(βχ)kΛt,t+k
(
P rq,t+kΓt+kTt+k −
Wt+k
Pq,t+k
+
κ
2
X2t+k(i)
)
because
Jt(i) =Et
[
P rq,tΓtTt −
Wt
Pq,t
+
κ
2
X2t (i)+
+ (βχ)Λt,t+1
(
P rq,t+1Γt+1Tt −
Wt+1
Pq,t+1
+
κ
2
X2t+1(i)
)
+
+ (βχ)2Λt,t+2
(
P rq,t+2Γt+2Tt+2 −
Wt+2
Pq,t+2
+
κ
2
X2t+2(i)
)
+ ...
]
=P rq,tΓtTt −
Wt
Pq,t
+
κ
2
X2t (i)+
+ (βχ)EtΛt,t+1
(
P rq,t+1Γt+1Tt+1 −
Wt+1
Pq,t+1
+
κ
2
X2t+1(i)+
(χβ)Λt+1,t+2
(
P rq,t+2Γt+2Tt+2 −
Wt+2
Pq,t+2
+
κ
2
X2t+2(i)
)
+ ...
)
=P rq,tΓtTt −
Wt
Pq,t
+
κ
2
X2t (i) + βχEtΛt,t+1Jt+1(i)
Denote:
W t(i) := Et
+∞∑
k=0
(βχ)kΛt,t+k
Wt+k(i)
Pq,t+K
(29)
then one can write:
Jt(i) = Et
+∞∑
k=0
(βχ)kΛt,t+k
(
P rq,t+kΓt+kTt+k +
κ
2
X2t+k(i)
)
−W t(i) (30)
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In the same way one can write the worker surplus defined in equation (21) as
Ht(i) =W t(i)− Et
+∞∑
k=0
(βχ)kΛt,t+k (b+ βΛt+k,t+k+1zt+kHx,t+k+1) (31)
On the other hand, let us denote Wt(r) the re-optimize wage for a firm that can rene-
gotiate its wage contract at time t, One has:19
Wt(r) = W
o
t
Then in t+ 1 one have:
EtWt+1(r) =θwWt(r) + (1− θw)EtW ot+1
=θwW
o
t + (1− θw)EtW ot+1
By induction one has:
EtWt+2(r) =Et
[
θwWt+1(r) + (1− θw)W ot+2
]
=Et
[
θw
(
θwW
o
t + (1− θw)EtW ot+1
)
+ (1− θw)W ot+2
]
=Et
[
θ2wW
o
t + θw(1− θw)W ot+1 + (1− θw)W ot+2
]
...
EtWt+k(r) =Et
[
θwWt+k(r) + (1− θw)W ot+k+1
]
=Et
[
θkwW
o
t + θ
k−1
w (1− θw)W ot+1 + ...+ (1− θw)W ot+k
]
(32)
Using this expression one can rewrite equation (29) as:
W t(r) = Et
[
Wt(r)
Pq,t
+ (βχ)Λt,t+1
Wt+1(i)
Pq,t+1
+ (βχ)2Λt,t+2
Wt+2(r)
Pq,t+2
+ ...
]
= Et
[
W ot
Pq,t
+ (βχ)Λt,t+1
1
Pq,t+1
(
θwW
o
t + (1− θw)W ot+1
)
+
+ (βχ)2Λt,t+2
1
Pq,t+2
(
θ2wW
o
t + θw(1− θw)W ot+1 + (1− θw)W ot+2
)
+ ...
...+ (βχ)kΛt,t+k
1
Pq,t+k
(
θkwW
o
t + θ
k−1
w (1− θw)W ot+1 + ...+ (1− θw)W ot+k
)
+ ...
]
= Et
[
W ot
Pq,t
+ (βχ)
Λt,t+1
Pq,t+1
θkwW
o
t + ...+ (βχ)
kΛt,t+k
Pq,t+k
θkwW
o
t + ...
+(βχ)
Λt,t+1
Pq,t+1
(1− θw)W ot+1 + (βχ)2
Λt,t+2
Pq,t+2
θw(1− θw)W ot+1 + ...+ (βχ)k
Λt,t+k
Pq,t+k
θk−1w (1− θw)W ot+1 + ...
]
= Et
(
1 + (βχθw)
Pq,t
Pq,t+1
Λt,t+1 + ...+ (βχθw)
k Pq,t
Pq,t+k
Λt,t+k + ...
)
W ot
Pq,t
+
+Et
(
1 + (βχθw)
Pq,t
Pq,t+1
Λt,t+1 + ...+ (βχθw)
k Pq,t
Pq,t+k
Λt,t+k + ...
)
(βχ)(1− θw)Λt,t+1
Pq,t+1
W ot+1 + ...
Let us denote:
∆t :=
+∞∑
s=0
(βχθw)
s Pq,t
Pq,t+s
Λt,t+s
19As explained in the body of the paper, all the firms face the same problem. Then they choose the same
wage, so the optimal wage for a renegotiating firm does not depend on i
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then one has:
W t(r) =Et∆t
W ot
Pq,t
+ Et(βχ)(1− θw)∆t+1 Λt,t+1
Pq,t+1
W ot+1 + Et(βχ)2(1− θw)∆t+2
Λt,t+2
Pq,t+2
W ot+2 + ...
=Et∆t
W ot
Pq,t
+ Et
+∞∑
k=1
(1− θw)(βχ)kΛt,t+k
Pq,t+k
∆t+kW
o
t+k
=Et∆t
W ot
Pq,t
+ Et
+∞∑
k=0
(1− θw)(βχ)k+1 Λt,t+k+1
Pq,t+k+1
∆t+k+1W
o
t+k+1
Let us denote Jt(r) the firm surplus of a firm that can renegotiate its wage contract at
time t and Ht(r) the worker surplus for a worker working in a renegotiating firm. Using
this expression and equations (30) and (31), one can write:
Jt(r) =Et
+∞∑
k=0
(βχ)kΛt,t+k
(
P rq,t+kΓt+kTt+k +
κ
2
X2t+k(r)− (1− θw)(βχ)
Λt+k,t+k+1
Pq,t+k+1
∆t+k+1W
o
t+k+1
)
− Et∆tW
o
t
Pq,t
(33)
Ht(r) =Et∆t
W ot
Pq,t
(34)
−Et
+∞∑
k=0
(βχ)kΛt,t+k
(
b+
V (Tt)
U ′(Ct)
+ βΛt+k,t+k+1zt+kHx,t+k+1.
−(1− θw)(βχ)Λt+k,t+k+1
Pq,t+k+1
∆t+k+1W
o
t+k+1
)
A.3 Nash Bargaining
Using the definition of ξt one has:
ξt =Pq,t
∂
∂W ot
Et
[
∆t
W ot
Pq,t
− Et
+∞∑
k=0
(βχ)kΛt,t+k
(
b+
V (Tt)
U ′(Ct)
+βΛt+k,t+k+1zt+kHx,t+k+1 − (1− θw)(βχ)Λt+k,t+k+1
Pq,t+k+1
∆t+k+1W
o
t+k+1
)]
ξt =Et∆t
Then one has:
ξt =1 + (βχθw)Et
Pq,t
Pq,t+1
Λt,t+1ξt+1 (35)
Using equation (16) one can write the surplus for a renegotiating firm as:
Jt(r) =P
r
q,tΓtTt −
W ot
Pq,t
− κ
2
(
θwX
2
t (W
o
t ) + (1− θw)X2t (W ot+1)
)
(36)
+ βθwEt(χ+Xt(W ot ))Λt,t+1J˜t+1(W ot ) + β(1− θw)Et(χ+Xt(W ot+1))Λt,t+1J˜t+1(W ot+1)
(37)
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where
κXt(W
o
t ) =βEtΛt,t+1Jt+1(W ot )
J˜t+1(W
o
t ) :=Pq,t+1Γt+1Tt+1 −
W ot
Pq,t+1
− κ
2
X2t+1(i) + β(χ−X2t+1(i))Λt+1,t+2Jt+2(i)
Then using the definition of Σt(r) one has:
Σt(r) =− Pq,tEt
(
− 1
Pq,t
− κ
2
θw
β2
κ2
Λ2t,t+12J˜t+1(W
o
t )
∂
∂W ot
J˜t+1(W
o
t ) + βθwχΛt,t+1
∂
∂W ot
J˜t+1(W
o
t )
+ θwβXt(W
o
t )Λt,t+1
∂
∂W ot
J˜t+1(W
o
t ) + βθwJ˜t+1(W
o
t )
β
κ
Λ2t,t+1
∂
∂W ot
J˜t+1(W
o
t )
)
=1− βθw(χ+Xt(W ot ))Pq,tEtΛt,t+1
∂
∂W ot
Jt+1(W
o
t )
Note that J˜t+1(W
o
t ) = Jt+1(r) and Xt(W
o
t ) = Xt(r). Then
Σt(r) =1 + βθw(χ+Xt(r))EtΛt,t+1
Pq,t
Pq,t+1
Σt+1(r) (38)
To derive the optimal wage equation (eq. 26) let us replace the values of equations (33)
and (34) in (24):
νt(r)
(
Et
+∞∑
k=0
(βχ)kΛt,t+k
(
P rq,tΓt+kTt+k +
κ
2
X2t+k(r)− (1− θw)(βχ)
Λt+k,t+k+1
Pq,t+k+1
∆t+k+1W
o
t+k+1
)
−∆tW
o
t
Pq,t
)
=
= (1− νt(r))Et
(
∆t
W ot
Pq,t
+
−
+∞∑
k=0
(βχ)kΛt,t+k
(
b+
V (Tt)
U ′(Ct)
+ βΛt+k,t+k+1zt+kHx,t+k+1 − (1− θw)(βχ)Λt+k,t+k+1
Pq,t+k+1
∆t+k+1W
o
t+k+1
))
Et∆t
W ot
Pq,t
=Et
+∞∑
k=0
(βχ)kΛt,t+k
(
νt(r)
(
P rq,t+kΓt+kTt+k +
κ
2
X2t+k(r)
)
+
(1− νt(r))
(
b+
V (Tt)
U ′(Ct)
+ βΛt+k,t+k+1zt,kHx,t+k+1
)
+
−(1− θw)(βχ)Λt+k,t+k+1
Pq,t+k+1
∆t+k+1W
o
t+k+1
)
=Et
[
νt(r)
(
Pq,tΓtTt +
κ
2
X2t+k(r)
)
+ (1− νt(r))(b+ V (Tt)
U ′(Ct)
+ βΛt,t+1ztHx,t+1)
−(1− θw)(βχ)Λt,t+1
Pq,t+1
∆t+1W
o
t+1 + (βχ)Λt,t+1∆t+1
W ot+1
Pq,t+1
]
=Et
[
νt(r)
(
Pq,tΓtTt +
κ
2
X2t+k(r)
)
+ (1− νt(r))
(
b+
V (Tt)
U ′(Ct)
+βΛt,t+1ztHx,t+1) + (βχθw)Λt,t+1∆t+1
W ot+1
Pq,t+1
]
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Then one obtains equation (26). Remark that iterating this equation one has:
Et∆tW ot =EtW tart (r) + Et(βχθw)∆t+1W or,t+1Λt,t+1
Et∆tW ot+1 =EtW tart+1(r) + Et(βχθw)∆t+2W or,t+2Λt+1,t+2
...
Then one can rewrite (26) as:
Et∆tW ot =EtW tart (r) + Et(βχθw)Λt,t+1
(
W tart+1(r) + βχθw∆t+2W
o
r,t+2Λt+1,t+2
)
=Et
(
W tart (r) + (βχθw)Λt,t+1W
tar
t+1(r) + (βχθw)
2∆t+2Λt+1,t+2W
o
r,t+2
)
=Et
+∞∑
k=0
(βχθw)
kΛt+k,t+k+1W
tar
t+k(r)∆t+k+1
Then one has
ξtW
o
t = Et
+∞∑
k=0
(βχθw)
kΛt+k,t+k+1W
tar
t+k(r)ξt+k (39)
A.4 Aggregation and Equilibrium
Let me define,
Kt =
∫ 1
0
Kt(i)di, Et =
∫ 1
0
Et(i)di, Lt =
∫ 1
0
Lt(i)di, Vt =
∫ 1
0
Vt(i)di, Mt =
∫ 1
0
Mt(i)di
Define also the average wage across workers by:
Wt =
∫ 1
0
Wt(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
di
By Calvo assumption, one has the following wage aggregate equation:
Wt =
∫
set−wages
Wt(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
di+
∫
not−set−wages
Wt(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
di
=(1− θw)W ot
∫ 1
0
Lt(i)
Lt
di+ θw
∫ 1
0
Wt−1(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
di
=(1− θw)W ot + θw
∫ 1
0
Wt−1(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
di
The intermediate firms are homogeneous, then:
Qt =
∫ 1
0
Qt(i)di
At the equilibrium, total domestic supply of the intermediate good Qt must be equal to
the total demand by the domestic final good firm
∫ 1
0 Q˜t(j)dj, then using equation (28) one
has:
Qt = vp,tQ˜t
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where
vp,t :=
∫ 1
0
(
Pq,t(j)
Pq,t
)− 1+εp,t
εp,t
dj
is a price dispersion measure. Remark also that one has:
vp,t =P
1+εp,t
εp,t
q,t
∫ 1
0
Pq,t(j)
− 1+εp,t
εp,t dj
=P
1+εp,t
εp,t
q,t
θpP− 1+εp,tεp,tq,t−1 ∫ 1
0
(
Pq,t−1(j)
Pq,t−1
)− 1+εp,t
εp,t
dj + (1− θp)(P oq,t)
− 1+εp,t
εp,t

=θpΠ
1+εp,t
εp,t
q,t vt−1 + (1− θp)
(
P oq,t
Pq,t
)− 1+εp,t
εp,t
Aggregating the production function one has (Cf. Appendix Acurio-Va´sconez (2015)):
vp,tQ˜t =
(
xpA
ρ
E,tE
ρ
t + (1− xp)AρLK,t(Kαt (Ldt )1−α)ρ
)1/ρ
Given constants returns to scale in intermediate production and perfect capital an oil
mobility, the ratios Et(i)Kt(i) and
Qt(i)
Kt(i)
are the same across firms, then the marginal product
of labor Γ is also the same across firms. Equation 22 implies that hours are also equalized
across producers. Then using equations (13) and (15) one has
Se,t =P
r
q,txpA
σp
E,t
(
Et
Qt
)σp−1
rkt Sk,t =P
r
q,tα(1− xp)Aσpt,LK
(
Kt
Qt
)ασp−1( L¯t
Qt
)(1−α)σp
Γt =(1− xp)(1− α)Aσpt,LK
(
Kt
Qt
)ασp ( L¯t
Qt
)(1−α)σp
Define Xt the unconditional average value of the hiring rate:
Xt :=
∫ 1
0
Xt(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
di
From equation (18) one has:
κXt(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
= βEtΛt,t+1
[
P rq,tΓt+1Tt+1
Lt(i)
Lt
−Wr,t+1(i)Lt(i)
Lt
+
κ
2
X2t+1(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
+ χκXt+1(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
]
Taking the integral on both sides one has:
κXt =βEtΛt,t+1
[
P rq,tΓt+1Tt+1 −
1
Pq,t+1
∫ 1
0
Wt+1(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
di+
κ
2
∫ 1
0
X2t+1(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
di+
+χκ
∫ 1
0
Xt+1(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
di
]
=βEtΛt,t+1
[
P rq,t+1Γt+1Tt+1 −Wr,t+1 +
κ
2
X2t+1 + χκXt+1
]
+βEtΛt,t+1
[∫ 1
0
(κ
2
X2t+1(i)−Wr,t+1(i) + χκXt+1(i)
) Lt(i)
Lt
di−
(κ
2
X2t+1 −Wr,t+1 + χκXt+1
)]
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Then one has:
κXt = βEtΛt,t+1
[
P rq,t+1Γt+1Tt+1 −Wr,t+1 +
κ
2
X2t+1 + χκXt+1
]
+ Ωx,t (40)
where
Ωx,t := βEtΛt,t+1
[∫ 1
0
(κ
2
X2t+1(i)−Wr,t+1(i) + χκXt+1(i)
) Lt(i)
Lt
di−
(κ
2
X2t+1 −Wr,t+1 + χκXt+1
)]
Define the average value of workers, the average worker surplus and the average value
of the firm marginal surplus respectively by:
Dt :=
∫ 1
0
Dt(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
di, Ht :=
∫ 1
0
Ht(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
di, Jt :=
∫ 1
0
Jt(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
di
Multiplying equation (21) by
L(i)
Lt
and taking integral in both sides one has:
Ht =Wr,t − b− V (Tt)
U ′(Ct)
+ βEtΛt,t+1
[∫ 1
0
χ (Dt+1(i)− Ut+1) Lt(i)
Lt
di− ztHx,t+1
]
=Wr,t − b− V (Tt)
U ′(Ct)
+ βEtΛt,t+1
[∫ 1
0
χDt+1(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
di− χUt+1 − ztHx,t+1
]
=Wr,t − b− V (Tt)
U ′(Ct)
+ βEtΛt,t+1
[∫ 1
0
χDt+1(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
di− χUt+1 − zt(Dx,t+1 − Ut+1)
]
=Wr,t − b− V (Tt)
U ′(Ct)
+ βEtΛt,t+1
[∫ 1
0
χDt+1(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
di+ χUt+1 − zt(Dx,t+1 − Ut+1)
]
=Wr,t − b− V (Tt)
U ′(Ct)
+ βEtΛt,t+1
[∫ 1
0
χDt+1(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
di− (χ− zt)Ut+1 − ztDx,t+1
]
Remark that one also has Ut+1 = Dt+1 −Ht+1, then:
Ht =Wr,t − b− V (Tt)
U ′(Ct)
+ (χ− zt)βEtΛt,t+1Ht+1 + ΩH,t (41)
where:
ΩH,t :=βEtΛt,t+1
[
χ
(∫ 1
0
Dt+1(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
di−Dt+1
)
− zt (Dx,t+1 −Dt+1)
]
In the same way, using equation (16) one has:
Jt =P
r
q,tΓtTt −Wr,t +
∫ 1
0
κ
2
X2t (i)
Lt(i)
Lt
+ βχEtΛt,t+1
∫ 1
0
Jt+1(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
di
=P rq,tΓtTt −Wr,t +
κ
2
X2t + βχEtΛt,t+1Jt+1 + ΩJ,t (42)
where
ΩJ,t :=
κ
2
(∫ 1
0
X2t (i)
Lt(i)
Lt
di−X2t
)
+ βχEtΛt,t+1
(∫ 1
0
Jt+1(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
di− Jt+1
)
Aggregating the government constraint one has:
Gt = Bt − (1− it−1Bt−1)− (1− Lt)bPq,t − Taxt
Finally the resource constraint is given by:
Sc,tCt + Sk,tIt +Gr,t = P
r
q,tQt − Se,tEt −
κ
2
∫ 1
0
X2t (i)Lt(i)di
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.43
Oil and Unemployment 30
A.5 Steady State
I denote Z the steady state for the variable Zt. The following equations define the steady
state value of the model.
Households
Sc =
(
(1− xc) + xcS
σ
σc−1
e
)σc−1
σ
Ce =xcS
1
σc−1
e S
−1
σc−1
c C
Cq =(1− xc)Sc −1
σc − 1C
i =
1
β
− 1
rk =
1
β
− 1 + δ
I =δK
Λ =1
ScC =P
r
qQ− SeE −
κ
2
X2L− δSkK − ωQ
Employment Dynamics
X =ρ
L =
z
ρ+ z
ρL =M
S =1− L
Firms, Government and GDP
P rq =
1
Mp(
Q
E
)1−σp
=
Se
P rq xpA
σp
E
K
Q
=
α
rkSk
(
P rq −
E
Q
)
(
L¯
Q
)(1−α)σp
=
1− xpAσpE
(
E
Q
)σp
(1− xp)AσpLK
(
K
Q
)ασp
Γ =(1− xp)(1− α)AσpLK
(
K
Q
)ασp ( L¯
Q
)(1−α)σp−1
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Remark that:∫ 1
0
κ
2
X2t+1(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
di =
κ
2
∫ 1
0
(
Lt+1(i)
Lt+1
− χ
)2 Lt(i)
Lt
di
=
κ
2
[∫ 1
0
L2t+1(i)
L2t+1
Lt(i)
Lt
di− 2χ
∫ 1
0
Lt+1(i)
Lt+1
Lt(i)
Lt
di− χ2Lt
]
at steady state employment share are constants, i.e. L(i) = L, then:∫ 1
0
κ
2
X2t+1(i)
Lt(i)
Lt
di =
κ
2
(1− 2χ+ χ2)
=
κ
2
X2
Then one has
κX = β(P rq ΓT −Wr +
κ
2
X2 + χκX) (43)
Finally one has also
xp =α
1
ηp
e Mσpp
Q =
(
xpA
σp
E E
σp + (1− xp)AσpLK(KαL1−α)
) 1
σp
vp =1
Q =Q˜
Gr =ωQ
Sc
Y
Q
=P rq − Se
E
Q
− κ
2
X2
L
Q
L¯ =LT
P rq Γ =T
w˜C
Nash Bargaining, Wages and Surplus
At steady state, ν(r) = ν and Σ(r) = Σ, then:
ν =
η
η + (1− η)Σξ
ξ =
1
1− χβθw
Σ =
1
1− βθw
At steady state one has W tar(r) = W tar and W = W o then Wr = W
o
r . Using equation
(26) one can write:
ξW or =W
tar + (βχθw)W
o
r
ξ(1− βχθw)W or =W tar
W or =W
tar
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.43
Oil and Unemployment 32
At steady state, hiring rates are identical across firms, then Xt(i) = Xt, then:
Dx =
∫ 1
0
D(i)
X(i)L(i)
XL
di = D ⇒ H = Hx
Using equations (21) and (23) one then has:
H =
1
1− (x− z)β
(
Wr − b− V (T )
U ′(C)
)
=
1
1− (x− z)β
(
Wr − b− CT
1+ω˜
1 + ω˜
)
J =
1− η
η
Σ
ξ
H
Using equation (27) one also has:
Wr = W
tar =ν(P rq ΓT +
κ
2
X2) + (1− ν)(b+ V (T )
U ′(C)
+ βzH)
=ν(P rq ΓT +
κ
2
X2) + (1− ν)
(
b+
V (T )
U ′(C)
+
βz
1− (x− z)βWr −
βz
1− (x− z)β
(
b+
V (T )
U ′(C)
))
Using equation (43) one can replace the value of Wr in this last equation, having:
Wr =P
r
q ΓT
(
ν + (1− ν) βz
1− (x− z)β
)
+
κ
2
X2
(
ν + (1− ν) βz
1− (x− z)β
)
− (1− ν)κX z(1− χβ)
1− (x− z)β + (1− ν)
(1− χβ)
1− (x− z)β
(
b+
V (T )
U ′(C)
)
=
1− χβ
1− (x− z)β
(
ν
(
P rq ΓT +
κ
2
X2 + zκX
)
+ (1− ν)
(
b+
V (T )
U ′(C)
))
+
βz
1− (x− z)βP
r
q ΓT +
κ
2
X2
βz
1− (x− z)β − κX
z(1− χβ)
1− (x− z)β
then:
Wr
(
1− βz
1− (χ− z)β
)
=
1− βχ
1− (x− z)β
(
ν
(
P rq ΓT +
κ
2
X2 + zκX
)
+ (1− ν)
(
b+
V (T )
U ′(C)
))
Wr =
(
ν
(
P rq ΓT +
κ
2
X2 + zκX
)
+ (1− ν)
(
b+
V (T )
U ′(C)
))
Remark that one can rewrite the steady state of equation (27) as:
Wr = ν
(
P rq ΓT +
κ
2
X2 + zκX
)
+ (1− ν )˜b(P rq ΓT +
κ
2
X2)
where:
b˜ :=
b+ V (T )U ′(C)
P rq ΓT +
κ
2X
2
(44)
and
Wr = P
r
q ΓT +
κ
2
X2 − κX
β
(1− χβ)
I assume that the steady state of oil and capital real prices are equal to 1 as well as the
steady states of both technologies processes. Then:
Se := Sk := AE := ALK := 1
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B Appendix B: Log-linearized Model
Small letters represent the log-deviation of each variable with respect its steady state,
zt := log(Zt) − log(Z) ≈ Zt−ZZ . For the rental rate of capital (rkt ), the investment (It),
both transition probabilities q˜t and zt, the stochastic discount factor Λt,t+1, and the Nash
bargaining variables, ν, ξ and Σ, the log-deviation will be represented with a hat over
the variable. One has: Small case letters represent the log-deviation of each variable with
respect its steady state, zt := log(Zt)− log(Z) ≈ Zt−ZZ . For the rental rate of capital (rkt ),
the investment (It), the transition probabilities q˜t and zt, the stochastic discount factor
Λt,t+1, and the Nash bargaining variables, ν, ξ and Σ, the log-deviation will be represented
with a hat over the variable. One has the following equations:
sc,t =
((
Se
Sc
) σ
σ−1
)
xcse,t (B.1)
cq,t =ct − 1
σc − 1sc,t (B.2)
ce,t =ct +
1
σc − 1(se,t − sc,t) (B.3)
ct =Et[ct+1]− (it − Et[pic,t+1]) (B.4)
it =(1− β(1− δ))Et[r̂t+1] + Et[pik,t+1] (B.5)
it =φiit−1 + φi(φpipiq,t + φyyt) + εi (B.6)
δÎt =kt+1 − (1− δ)kt (B.7)
Qσpqt =xp(AEE)
σp(ae,t + et) + (1− xp)AσpLK(KαL1−α)σp(alk,t + αkt + (1− α)(lt + tt))
(B.8)
γt =(1− σp)qt + σpalk,t + ασpkt + ((1− α)σp − 1)(lt + tt) (B.9)
se,t =(σp − 1)(et − qt) + prq,t + σpae,t (B.10)
rˆt + sk,t =p
r
q,t + (1− σp)qt + (ασp − 1)kt + (1− α)σp(lt + tt) + σpalk,t (B.11)
Λˆt,t+1 =− pic,t+1 − ct+1 + ct (B.12)
piq,t =
(1− βθp)(1− θp)
θp
P rq,t +
(1− βθp)(1− θp)εp
θp(1 + εp)
εp,t + βEtpiq,t+1 (B.13)
mt =(1− γ)vt + γst (B.14)
lt+1 =lt + ρxt (B.15)
ˆ˜qt =mt − vt (B.16)
zˆt =mt − st (B.17)
st =− L
S
lt (B.18)
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ˆ˜qt + vt =xt + lt (B.19)
pik,t =piq,t + sk,t − sk,t−1 (B.20)
pic,t =piq,t + sc,t − sc,t−1 (B.21)
se,t =ρsese,t−1 + ese,t (B.22)
sk,t =ρsksk,t−1 + esk,t (B.23)
gr,t =ρggr,t−1 + ρgaeeae,t + ρgalkealk,t + eg,t (B.24)
ae,t =ρaeae,t−1 + eae,t (B.25)
alk,t =ρalkalk,t−1 + ealk,t (B.26)
εi,t =ρiei,t−1 + eei,t (B.27)
εp,t =ρpεp,t−1 − νpep,t−1 + ep,t (B.28)
B.1 Budget constraint
Let us log-linearize the budget-constraint equation:
Sc,t − Sc
Sc
+
Ct − C
C
=
Q
ScC
(P rq,t − P rq ) +
P rq
ScC
(Qt −Q)− E
ScC
(Se,t − Se)− Se
ScC
(Et − E)
− I
ScC
(Sk,t − Sk)− Sk
ScC
(It − I)− κ
2ScC
∫ 1
0
2X(i)L(i)di(Xt −X)
− κ
2ScC
∫ 1
0
X2(i)di(Lt − L) 1
ScC
(Gr,t −Gr)
from where one obtains:
C
Q
(sc,t + ct) =
P rq
Sc
(prq,t + qt)−
SeE
ScQ
(se,t + et)− SkI
ScQ
(sk,t + Iˆt)− κX
2L
2ScQ
(2xt + lt)− Gr
ScQ
gr,t
(B.29)
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B.2 Hiring rate
Remark that dx,t = dt and then hx,t = ht. Let us log-linearize equation (40):
20
κXL(xt + lt) =βEt
[
P rq ΓLT (Λt,t+1 − Λ) + ΓTL(P rq,t − P rq ) + TP rq L(Γt − Γ)
+ P rq ΓT (Lt − L) + P rq ΓL(Tt − T )
−WrL(Λt,t+1 − Λ)− L(Wr,t −Wr)−W (Lt − L)
+
κ
2
X2L(Λt,t+1 − Λ) + κXL(Xt+1 −X) + κ
2
X2(Lt − L)
+ χκXL(Λt,t+1 − Λ) + χκL(Xt+1 −X) + χκX(Lt − L)
+
∫ 1
0
κ
2
X2(i)L(i)di(Λt,t+1 − Λ) +
∫ 1
0
κX(i)L(i)di(Xt+1 −X) +
∫ 1
0
κ
2
X2(i)di(Lt − L)
− κ
2
X2L(Λt,t+1 − Λ)− κXL(Xt −X)− κ
2
X2(Lt − L)
−
∫ 1
0
Wr(i)L(i)di(Λt,t+1 − Λ)−
∫ 1
0
χκL(i)di(Xt −X) +
∫ 1
0
χκX(i)di(Lt − L)
+
∫ 1
0
χκX(i)L(i)di(Λt,t+1 − Λ) +
∫ 1
0
χκL(i)di(Xt+1 −X) +
∫ 1
0
χκX(i)di(Lt − L)
+WrL(Λt,t+1 − Λ) + L(Wr,t −Wr) +Wr(Lt − L)
−χκXL(Λt,t+1 − Λ)− χκL(Xt −X)− χκX(Lt − L)]
=βEt
[
P rq ΓL(Λˆt,t+1 + p
r
q,t + γt+1)−WrL(Λˆt,t+1 + wr,t+1)
+
κ
2
X2L(Λˆt,t+1 + 2xt+1)χκXL(Λˆt,t+1 + xt+1)
]
+ βEt
[
P rq ΓL−WrL+
κ
2
XL+ χκXL
]
lt
From where one then has:
xt = EtΛˆt,t+1 +
β
κX
Et
[
P rq ΓT (p
r
q,t+1 + γt+1 + tt+1)−Wrwr,t+1
]
+ βEtxt+1 (B.30)
B.3 Nash Bargaining
Log-linearizing equation (35) one has:
ξˆt =(χβθw)Et
[
Λˆt,t+1 − piq,t+1 + ξˆt+1
]
(B.31)
On the other hand, log-linearizing equations (25) and (38) one obtains:
νˆt(r) =(1− ν)(ξˆt − Σˆt(r))
Σˆt(r) =βχθwxt(r) + βθwEt
[
Λˆt,t+1 − piq,t+1 + Σˆt+1(r)
]
Remark that averaging across firms one has:
Σˆt = βχθwxt + βθwEt
[
Λˆt,t+1 − piq,t+1 + Σˆt+1
]
(B.32)
Then one has:
νˆt =(1− ν)(ξˆt − Σˆt) (B.33)
20Because Ωx = 0, one can not log-linearize directly Ωx,t.
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B.4 Wage Dynamics
Log-linearizing equation (26) one obtains:
wor,t + ξˆt = Et
+∞∑
k=0
(βχθw)
k(Λˆt+k,t+k+1 + ξˆt+k+1 + w
tar
t+k(r))
Using the log-linear equation for ξˆt then:
wor,t + ξˆt =Et
+∞∑
k=0
(βχθw)
k(ξˆt+k + (βχθw)piq,t+k + w
tar
t+k(r))
wor,t =βχθwpiq,t + w
tar
t (r) + βχθww
o
r,t+1 (B.34)
From equation (B.30) one can write:
xt − xt(r) =− βWr
κX
Et(wr,t+1 − wr,t+1(r)) + βEt [xt+1 − xt+1(r)]
=− βWr
κX
Et(wr,t+1 − wr,t+1(r))
− ββWr
κX
Et(wr,t+2 − wr,t+2(r))
− β2βWr
κX
Et(wr,t+3 − wr,t+3(r))
...
On the other hand, let us log-linearize the aggregate wage equation:
WL(wt + lt) =(1− θw)L(W o −Wt) + (1− θw)W (Lt − L) + θw
∫ 1
0
L(i)di(Wt−1 −W )+
+ θw
∫ 1
0
W (i)di(Lt − L)
wt =(1− θw)wot + θwwt−1
Then in real terms one has:
wr,t = (1− θw)wor,t + θwwr,t−1 − θwpiq,t (B.35)
Then log-linearizing the expressions on equation (32) one can write by recurrence:
Et [wt+k − wt+k(r)] = θkw(wr,t − wor,t)
and then:
xt(r) =xt +
βθwWr
κX(1− βθw)(wr,t − w
o
r,t) (B.36)
Log-linearizing equation (27), one has:
Wrw
tar
t (r) =Et
[
νP rq,tΓT (p
r
q,t + γt + tt) + νκX
2xt(r)+ (B.37)
+ν
(
κ
2
X2 − βzH − b− V (Tt)
U ′(C)
+ P rq,tΓT
)
νˆt(r) + βzH(1− ν)(zˆt + Λˆt,t+1 + ht+1)+
−νV (T )
U ′(C)
(ct + (1 + ω˜)tt)
]
(B.38)
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and log-linearizing equations (41) and (42) one also has:
ht =
Wr
H
wr,t + βχEt
[
ht+1 + Λˆt,t+1
]
− βzEt
[
zˆt + ht+1 + Λˆt,t+1 − V (T )
U ′(C)
(ct + (1 + ω˜)tt)
]
jt =P
r
q ΓT (p
r
q,t + γt + tt)−Wrwr,t + κX2xt − βχ(Λˆt,t+1 + jt+1)
Then using these equations and those obtained when log-linearizing the bargaining equa-
tions, one has:
ht − ht(r) =Wr
H
(wr,t − wr,t(r)) + β(x− z)Et [ht+1 − ht+1(r)]
jt − j(r) =−
Wr
J
(wr,t − wr,t(r)) + κX
2
J
(xt − xt(r))− βχEt [jt+1 − jt+1(r)]
Σˆt − Σˆt(r) =− Wr
κ
β2θ2w
1− βθ2w
1
1− βθw (wr,t − w
o
r,t)
νˆt − νˆt(r) =− (1− ν)(Σˆt − Σˆt(r))
Consider now a firm renegotiating at time t + 1, denoted r′. The following relationships
are verified:
Et
[
wr,t+k − wr,t+k(r′)
]
=θk−1w Et
[
wr,t+1 − wor,t+1
]
Et
[
(xt+k − xt+k(r′)
]
=− βθ
k
wWr
κX(1− βθw)Et
[
wr,t+1 − wor,t+1
]
Et
[
ht+1 − ht+1(r′)
]
=
Wr
H(1− βθw(χ− z))Et
[
wr,t+1 − wor,t+1
]
Et
[
jt+1 − jt+1(r′)
]
=− Wr
J(1− βθw)Et
[
wr,t+1 − wor,t+1
]
Et
[
νˆt+1 − νˆt+1(r′)
]
=
Wr
κ
β2θ2w
1− βθ2w
1− ν
1− βθw (wr,t+1 − w
o
r,t+1)
Log-linearizing the Nash condition for a firm renegotiating wages at time t+ 1, one has:
Et
[
jt+1(r
′) +
1
1− ν νˆt+1(r
′)
]
= Etht+1(r′)
Then:
Etht+1 = Et
[
jt+1 +
1
1− ν νˆt+1 + ζ(wr,t+1 − w
o
r,t+1)
]
where:
ζ := −Wr
(
1
κ(1− βθw)
β2θ2w
1− βθ2w
− 1
J(1− βθw) −
1
H(1− βθw(χ− z))
)
Log-linearizing equation (17) one has
xt = Et
[
Λˆt,t+1 + jt+1
]
Then replacing for jt+1 one can re-write
Et
[
ht+1 + Λˆt,t+1
]
= xt + Et
[
1
1− ν νˆt+1 + ζ(wr,t+1 − w
o
r,t+1)
]
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Finally, one can re-write equation (B.37) as
wtart (r) = w
tar
t + φw(wr,t − wor,t) + ψwEt
[
wr,t+1 − wor,t+1
]
(B.39)
where
wtart :=φ(p
r
q,t + γt + tt) + φxxt + φz zˆt + φν νˆt + ψνEtνˆt+1 + φc(ct + (1 + ω˜)tt) (B.40)
and
φw :=
1
(1− βθw)
(
βθwνX − ν(1− ν)
κ
β2θ2w
1− βθ2w
(
P rq ΓT +
κ
2
X2 − βzH − b− νCT
1+ω˜
1 + ω˜
))
ψw :=
βzH(1− ν)
Wr
ζ
φ :=
νP rq ΓT
Wr
φx :=
1
Wr
(νκX2 + βzH(1− ν))
φz :=
βzH(1− ν)
Wr
φν :=
ν
Wr
(
P rq ΓT +
κ
2
X2 − βzH − b− CT
1+ω˜
1 + ω˜
)
ψν :=
βzH
Wr
φc :=− νCT
1+ω˜
1 + ω˜
Replacing equation (B.39) in equation (B.34) and using (B.35) one can derive a simplified
expression for the real wage
wr,t =
1− θw
θwφ˜
wtart +
1 + φw
φ˜
wr,t−1 +
βχ− ψw
φ˜
wr,t−1 +
1
φ˜
(
βχ
1− θw − 1− φw
)
piq,t (B.41)
+
βχθw − ψw
φ˜
Etpiq,t+1
where
φ˜ :=
1
θw
+ βχθw + φw − ψw
Equations B.1 to B.28, B.29, B.30, B.31, B.32, B.33, B.40 and B.41 complete the
log-linear model.
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